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I.

THE VANISHING BEGINNINGS

Between 1945 and 1947, Gilles Deleuze gave to several prestigious publications
five texts that together formed the first moment of his work—the moment prior to
the great silence preceding the appearance of Empiricism and Subjectivity. The texts
were brilliant and singular and were the reason that, despite his young age, all those
in the entourage of Marie-Madeleine Davy, his mentor during the Occupation, saw
in Deleuze a “new Sartre.”1 Later on, however, he chose to pull these texts from his
bibliography, and he even went as far as to forbid any reproduction or reunion in
volume, be it even after his death. These texts saw themselves fully excluded from
the canon of his work—as if Deleuze had wanted to signify that they, too, were part
of the meditative silence preceding his first veritable work: his first book. These texts
could hold no status other than that of the scholastic exercise, of the draft having no
purpose other than to serve as training ground for the progressive development of
future concepts. When, much later, Deleuze presented his famous definition of
philosophy—philosophy is “the creation of concepts”2—he was undoubtedly thinking
back to his own development. It was these five texts that he was hoping to see
disappear and replaced with a long, unseen stretch that could have constituted the
“somber precursor” of his own thought; to this end, the existence of his first texts
was too clear and distinct. The event of the creation of a concept could not be thought
of as a fiat lux because it was already included in the pleat of the world. However,
this inclusion was still, and necessarily, in the process of unfolding. On the other
hand, if this event had a precursor, it had no draft; in the precursor the event’s
perfection had already to be whole, as the entire content of a rhizome can be found
in the smallest of its branches. Such, perhaps, was the justification and purpose of
Deleuze’s renunciation of his first texts: once they had been published, they became
too real. They were no longer virtual enough.
II. DESCRIPTION OF WOMAN

Deleuze’s very first text, Description of Woman: For a Philosophy of the Sexed Other,
which appeared in Poesie 45 in the fall of 1945, could be considered privileged
evidence in the quest for the reasons that pushed Deleuze to make these youthful
texts disappear. 3 Since the 1943 publication of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and
Nothingness, Deleuze ceaselessly professed his growing admiration for the book, as
Michel Tournier described in Le Vent Paraclet.4 When he discovered Sartre’s book,
explains Tournier, Deleuze telephoned him every day so as to include him in the
enthusiastic observations born as his reading progressed. But, soon after France’s
Liberation following World War II, when Sartre’s fame increased exponentially,
Deleuze’s disappointment was commensurate with his erstwhile enthusiasm; Sartre,
1.

Cf. Francois Dosse, Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari: Biographie Croisée 116 (2007).

2.

Cf. Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Qu’Est-ce que la Philosophie? passim (1991).

3.

Gilles Deleuze, Description de la Femme: Pour une Philosophie d’Autrui Sexuée, 28 Poésie 28–39 (1945).

4.

Michel Tournier, Le Vent Paraclet (1977).
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after all, was a humanist. In the meantime, Description of Woman had appeared and,
while it was intended to act as an addendum to the chapters of Being and Nothingness
relative to desire and sexuality, it was also his way of picking up one of Sartre’s
reproaches of Heidegger. Sartre had reproached Heidegger’s philosophy for having
painted only the portrait of an asexual humanity—precisely where, in reality,
sexuality is the cause of everything. In Description of Woman, Deleuze therefore
attempts to give “philosophical dignity” to the forgotten figure of woman—a
“dignity” whose principal traits were formulated according to the terms of Sartrean
thought. However, even if this was something of a “pastiche” (as François Dosse
stressed5), Deleuze’s article showed early signs of several obsessions that one would
find again in his “recognized” works. First and foremost among these was his
appreciation for surfaces; in women, explained Deleuze, that which counts before all
else is makeup—that is, the manner by which an artificial surface is given to that
which would otherwise be nothing more than a blind interiority.
III. THEORIZING MAKEUP

In the eyes of the young Deleuze, in order to even begin to contemplate woman’s
fundamental interiority—as opposed to man’s fundamental exteriority—any theory
concerning woman had to be a theory about makeup. To this end, Deleuze
differentiated two main cosmetic categories: “surface” makeup (e.g., powders,
foundation, blush) and “cavity” makeup (e.g., mascara, eyeliner, lipstick).6 If cosmetics
of the first category, Deleuze explained, allow one to enhance the surface of a
woman’s face, then only those of the second category could help reveal, by tracing
the exterior, her fundamental interiority. To outline the eyes or the mouth is to invite
the viewer to plunge into this interiority, i.e., to challenge his existence. To challenge
his existence, Deleuze added, is to challenge the existence of the world—“woman is
a concrete universal, she is a world, not an exterior world, but the underside of the
world, the tepid interiority of the world, a concentration of the interiorized world.
Hence the prodigious sexual success of woman: to possess woman is to possess the
world.”7 Thus, in describing these two types of makeup and in presenting the woman
in makeup as keeper of the secret of the world’s interiority—a secret only accessible
by means of cosmetic artifice—Deleuze revealed himself. What he revealed about
himself was more than that which his future ethic of discretion would be able to
accept: he revealed the character—more importantly, the cerebral character—of his
relationship with sexuality and with women. However, he also revealed the instinctual
truth that feeds all ideas of mask, makeup, cosmetics, or simulacra—a formulated
truth, this time put in terms too sexed to be admissible. Even before he began
developing the theory of desire, the cosmic accents of which would bring him fame,
the real truth of this theory had already been made visible to all: there can be no desire
other than that of a man for a woman in makeup.
5.

Dosse, supra note 1, at 119.

6.

Deleuze, supra note 3, at 33–34.

7.

Id. at 32.
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IV. THE GIRL’S ENTRANCE

In Deleuze’s subsequent work, his fascination with the figure of woman would
take a more discreet and more complicated turn, and, henceforth, the woman of
Description would no longer make any explicit appearance. In the meantime, as
Catherine Clement noted (and who remains the only person to have done so), another
character would progressively take on a more considerable role in his work: the girl.8
From Deleuze’s Coldness and Cruelty 9 to his Kafka, from Proust and Signs10 to The
Logic of Sense,11 girls proliferate in Deleuze’s work as so many anamorphoses of the
forgotten woman.12 If, from this point on, neither makeup nor interiority is the main
concern, the girl, then, occupies a strange place within his system: that of the
perturbing other. The girl is the element whose presence spells the impossibility that an
order, whatever its form, is able to enjoy the comfort of its own enclosure—an order
where, most often, the actors are fathers and mothers. In Deleuze’s vocabulary, one
would say that girls represent numerous “lines of flight” through which that which
claims to be contained at the interior of an order actually ends up revealing the
insoluble dimension of this same claim. The most striking example of this is the role
that sisters, maids, and prostitutes (three different forms of the girl) play at the core of
Kafka’s work, as Deleuze and Guattari suggested in their Kafka.13 The machinery of
the law, in which the protagonists of Kafka’s work are constantly implicated, reveals
vacuoles that manage to except themselves from it. These are vacuoles—frenetic gaps
within the machinery of the law—where the law is turned upside-down and where it
has no power. The derangement that girls produce in Kafka’s characters is the same
derangement produced by Lewis Carroll’s Alice in the Queen of Hearts’s croquet
game14 and that is produced by the groups of adolescents in In Search of Lost Time’s
obsessive narrator. In all of these situations, a state of regulated things is confronted
by a reality that is stronger than its will to maintain regulation: the reality of desire.
V. THE DIVIDED WORLD OF WOMEN

When he moved from woman to girl, Deleuze initially did nothing more than pass
from the concrete reality of this desire (“to possess woman is to possess the world”) to
a more abstract, thus more euphemized, reality. Desire—instinctive and born of a
8.

Cf. C. Clément, Les Petites Filles ou les Aventures de la Philosophie, Gilles Deleuze, Paris,
Inculte, 2005, p. 17 et seq. (republication that became a special issue of L’Arc, n° 49, 1972, dedicated to
Deleuze) (on file with author).

9.

Gilles Deleuze, Présentation de Sacher-Masoch: Le Froid et le Cruel (1967) (on file with
author).

10.

Gilles Deleuze, Proust et les Signes (1964).

11.

Gilles Deleuze, Logique du Sens (1969).

12.

See Laurent de Sutter, Deleuze: La pratique du droit 59–60 (2009).

13.

Cf. Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Kafka: Pour une Littérature Mineure 113–19 (1975).

14.

See generally Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 112–29 (Boston, Lee & Shepard
1869) (1865) (narrating when Alice disrupts the Queen’s croquet match and is almost beheaded).
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positive idea of woman—became the pure concept of a negative idea of this same
woman, while the girl, in opposition with the mother, became the woman wearing
makeup. While, as a positive idea, the woman grants access to the interiority of the
world, as a negative idea, she does not grant men the satisfaction of a definitive
installation in the order of exteriority that is constitutive of man. This movement from
the concrete to the abstract, or from the positive to the negative, did not come without
a price: henceforth, the world of women would be divided into two unequal parts.
With the presence of the figure of the girl, access to the interiority of the world—or
the disconcertion of the installation in a pure exteriority—was no longer a possibility
open to all women. Only girls, as women wearing makeup, could claim to offer this
access, while other women, those not wearing makeup, found themselves confined in
the same exteriority as men—or, more accurately, found themselves deprived of their
constitutive interiority in such a way that their presence in the world of exteriority
suddenly had no value other than that of a ghost or specter. Similarly, for the young
Deleuze, makeup was the source of desire aroused by the experience of the interiority
offered by women, while, for the mature Deleuze, this source was found only within
girls. Thus, a kind of disequilibrium was introduced into women as a group: the power
to offer the experience of interiority was reserved for a minority, but this experience,
too, was affected by disequilibrium. Indeed, the experience of interiority no longer
brought about reconciliation with the world; it had become a perturbation.
VI. DISORDER AND TECHNÈ

Despite the fact that, as stated above, the figure of the girl is recurring, Deleuze
never described in a systematic manner the perturbation of the world’s order that this
figure introduces. The revolutionary force inherent in the desire aroused by the girl
was, to him, a precise enough explanatory factor that further development was
unnecessary. The question posed by the figure of the girl, for Deleuze, could be
answered by the desire that she provoked, i.e. in the Spinozism of the event that,
today, one still attaches to his name. However, the singular relationship in his work
involving the girl and desire merited further inquiry. Deleuze should have asked the
question that, according to him, was the most important: “How?” In other words,
how does the girl manage to perturb, through the desire that she arouses, the world’s
order—how does she create a “line of f light” interior its exteriority? That what
Deleuze called a “conceptual personae” be attached in a privileged manner to desire
signaled, in effect, that implicated here was something fitting of a drama. Desire
concerns not only the event and becoming—it concerns the machination of the event
and of becoming; it concerns their construction or creation: “How does one perturb
order?” “How does one create disorder?” Such was the nature of the question posed
by the figure of the girl in Deleuze’s work—a question to which the concept of desire,
as such, could provide no answer. In order to begin answering this question, one
would have to reread Description of Woman—that is, Deleuze needed to reconcile
with his own Sartrean past, indeed, with his own desires. The answer, then, would
have appeared clear as day. To create disorder, a very simple act suffices, and, as it is
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very simple, it is impossible to elude: she simply needs to pull out her tube of lipstick.
Cosmetics are, themselves, the techné of disorder.
VII. THE PORNO ORDER OF LAW

Perhaps it was necessary to give an example of the cosmetics of the event for which
Deleuze, owing to his strange obsession for girls, became nolens volens, the silent
advocate. In Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari made considerable efforts to establish the
validity of the following theorem, one that could have seemed a little extravagant:
the theorem that the law is written “on a porno book.”15 In their eyes, this theorem
had first to be considered as the enouncement of the reality, which the theorem
claimed provided the following description: the judges’ library in The Trial 16
contained only obscene works. However, beyond this description, the theorem
suggested that the reality thus described was also reality on another level: the level
that one could permissibly call “critique”—if the term were restituted, as it was by
Deleuze, to its specific usage. To say “the law is written on a book of porno” is to
underline that Kafka’s work, in staging judges as readers of obscene works, meant to
suggest something about the law itself. In other words, the fact is that the books
consulted by the judges during their audiences were works divorced not from their
function, but, on the contrary, from that which to them was the most fitting. If the
works the judges read could be said to constitute, together, a gigantic “porno book,”
it is precisely because they are books of law—or, more accurately: the book of the law.
Yet, since the obscene episodes described in these books were reminiscent of those
occurring in corridors of the Hall of Justice, an ambiguity appeared in Deleuze and
Guattari’s theorem. What was the difference between the depictions appearing in
the book of the law and the moments of derangement that Joseph K. experienced in
the company of maids, of girls, and of prostitutes? What was the difference between
the porno order of the law and the disorder—or perturbation—that, according to the
hypothesis formed elsewhere by Deleuze, girls supposedly herald? Could this be due
to the fact that the first case is solely concerned with images?
VIII. FANTASIES AS REALITIES

That an image is described as “porno”—or, in a broader sense, that it could give
rise to desire—also counts among the possibilities left aside by Deleuze until he wrote
his books on cinema. It is barely, if at all, that Deleuze, in a 1985 interview subsequent
to the publication of Cinema 2: The Time-Image, allowed himself to bring attention to
the lobotomized character of “the majority of cinematographic production, with its
arbitrary violence and its mindless eroticism.”17 Again, eroticism—as a category of the
explanation of the desire animating the images—was grafted onto the cerebral and
onto that of the image disconnected from any and all things imaginary. Moreover, at
15.

Deleuze & Guattari, supra note 13, at 90.

16.

Franz Kafka, The Trial 21 (David Wyllie trans., Project Gutenberg eBook 10th ed. 2005) (1925).

17.

Gilles Deleuze, Sur l’Image-Temps, in Pourparlers 86 (1990).
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around the same time, in the answers Deleuze gave to a questionnaire from a cinema
magazine, he did not hesitate to admit that he “did not attach much importance to the
notion of the imaginary.”18 Thus, it is easy to understand why the great absentee in
Deleuze’s philosophy of image is the notion of fantasy that Lacanian psychoanalysis
had attached to that of the imaginary. In his thought, there is no fantasy; there are
only realities whose modalities, while variable, nevertheless embody the general
character of these realities. However, because his philosophy is of an absolute realism,
Deleuze’s thought is obstructed by the figure of the girl who appears incessantly in his
work and who arouses the fantasies of those who encounter her, starting with Deleuze
himself. One can certainly speak of a “mindless eroticism” in the case of the
pornographic images in which Kafka’s judges delight, but what about the tricks
turned by prostitutes? Were they not “images” and thus “realities” able to claim a type
of dignity equivalent to that of other images, be they “porno” or not? On this point,
Deleuze was never clear. His taste for the cerebral prevented him from perceiving that
fantasy, as all things, could be called real.
IX. LAW’S DERANGEMENT

If, as Deleuze and Guattari hypothesized, a “porno book” is the cornerstone of
the order of the law, then it must also be the cornerstone of disorder—put differently,
porn is the milieu of the law. In the milieu of the law, porn is that which ordains
disorder: porn is the operation by which the law reveals its fantasized power and,
through this fantasy, its true impotence. In this sense, it is possible to maintain that
the cosmetics of the event—whose terms were laid out in Description of Woman—
were certainly a realism of fantasy. The concrete fantasy that is aroused by the
presence of the girl is the operator that introduces in the law an outside interior by
which the comfort of “exteriority” is quickly destroyed—or, more accurately,
deranged. If this operator of disorder is in fact cerebral, it is cerebral in the same way
that “mindless eroticism” is “lobotomized”—and, in turn, the same way that the
“imaginary” is constituted by the fantasy galvanizing the operator. When they wrote
that “the law is written on a porno book,” Deleuze and Guattari were suggesting,
despite themselves, that the law was much more than a book: it was an image.
Moreover, it was not only one image, but a film. This film of fantasies aroused by
girls is the medium through which the operation resulting in the complete
derangement of the order of the law extends and acts as that which makes possible
this same order. The reality of the order of the law is the same reality of the pornographic
fantasies aroused by girls—that is, by women in makeup, as makeup is that which gives
body to the fantasy of interiority. We can thus summarize all ambiguity of the role
played by the girl in Deleuze’s thought by saying that she is the incarnation of the
desire that gives rise to the event, as incarnation of fantasies that give rise to disorder.
But this ambiguity goes beyond her own reality; this ambiguity is somehow able to
contaminate all images.

18.

Gilles Deleuze, Doutes sur l’Imaginaire, in Pourparlers 94 (1990).
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X. THE SUBJECT STRIKES BACK

Like all of the philosophers of his generation, Deleuze interminably claimed that
he dismissed the subject of a specific and contemporary tendency of thought; but just
when he thought tendency departed, he, like his contemporaries, kept seeing it
reappear in his work.19 In Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema, though the phenomenon
is subtler than it is elsewhere, the outcome is the same: the ghostly return of the
spectator. When Jacques Rancière claimed that Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema was a
philosophy of nothing other than itself (and thus certainly not of cinema), he, too,
misunderstood this ghostly return.20 In claiming to establish a “natural history” of
cinema, in which different branches would designate different types of images,
Deleuze’s explicit agenda was to reinvent the concept of time. But the fact that this
reinvention was written within the framework of a history of cinema could lead one
to think that only a film (and, then, only a “great” film) was capable of delivering
experience. Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema, in this sense, was much closer to
phenomenology than were any of his other works—given that in his philosophy he
was proposing an aesthetic of the reception of time. Cinema’s images, as media princeps
of the different forms of time, were unthinkable without at least a spectator capable
of using them to draw up the exhaustive catalogue—a spectator like Deleuze himself,
or, for that matter, anybody. One understands better, then, why the “mindless
eroticism” about which he spoke in his interview on The Time-Image did not have, in
the catalogue, a positive counterpart. For Deleuze, eroticism was always “mindless”
in that he would substitute the pure cerebral nature of thought, vis-à-vis time, with
another cerebral nature. Here, the cerebral nature would be impure: the fantastic
experience of images. Given that, on one hand, eroticism was always “mindless,” and
that, on the other, all experience was that of a subject tormented by fantasies, the
conclusion was self-evident: all experience is mindless—thus erotic.
XI. DISMISSING THE EXPERIENCE OF IMAGES

It was necessary for Deleuze to relinquish his role as cinematic spectator in order
to describe images as pure forms of the concept of time and to forget the fantasies
that he had, in the first place, excluded. He needed to dismiss the experience of
images and, through this, the singular erotic experience of the spectator, so as to
relocate the girls in a film to a place where they would no longer pose a threat. For,
when he claimed to implement a system of time through the examination of the
different forms of images able to be adopted by the same system, he was actually
trying to avoid danger. This danger was the reappearance of Description of Woman
and, therefore, that of the “humanism” that he and Tournier had, at one time,
reproached in their predecessor, Sartre. Like Sartre, Deleuze failed to leave humanism
19.

See generally Slavoj Zizek, Le Sujet Qui Fâche: Le Centre Absent de l’Ontologie Politique
(Stathis Kouvélakis trans., 2007).

20. Cf. Jacques Rancière, L’affect indécis: Propos recueillis par Patrice Blouin, Elie During et Dork Zabunyan,

692–93, Revue Critique 142–43 (2005) (on file with author). Alain Badiou also made the same error.
See Alain Badiou, Deleuze: La Clameur de l’Être 27 (1997).
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behind—simply because he, like Sartre, continued to desire in the most banal and
least Spinozian mode possible. In rereading Description of Woman and in comparing
it with the figures of girls appearing elsewhere in his work, one realizes that the
praise of makeup was in fact a praise of images. Precisely, it was a praise of girls as
images—that is, the girls that one finds in magazines and to whom makeup gives a
remarkable reality. The catalogue of the different types of images—the drawing up
of which Deleuze dedicated himself to in his books about cinema—was the cerebral
form taken by the catalogue of the different types of girls. When he was describing
these different types of girls as a source of derangement within the order of the law,
it was thus necessary to understand that girls were, above all, a source of derangement
for him and, notably, for the philosophic order that he was trying to establish. Girls
were the persistent sign of the cerebral fantasy that pushed him to find in the concept
a world where the strength of desire could finally be expressed in full freedom.
XII. PORTRAIT OF THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER AS A YOUNG GIRL

With Description of Woman as the hidden key to the relationship that Deleuze
maintained with women and with images, it became possible to comprehend the extent
to which it was necessary to renounce this work. In truth, the renunciation came with
a drastic consequence: with it went the possibility of an “outside” to philosophy—a
place in the world where the concept would not be the only admissible entity. In the
same way that girls appear only as contraband in Deleuze’s work, this “outside” returned
from time to time in the most unexpected form. This form was that of legal practice.
Be it in his interviews with Claire Parnet, in A Thousand Plateaus,21 or in Coldness and
Cruelty, the practice of law, according to Deleuze, shared with girls a spectral status.
The reason for this shared status was clear though, undoubtedly, unexpected: girls and
the practice of law are, in reality, one and the same. In the same way as girls, legal practice,
in Deleuze’s writing, intervenes only to disturb the comfortable order of the law, the
same order of which philosophy claimed to be herald. The practice of law is the arena
in which the law—the system of rules that claim to uphold order—fails to enclose its
own exteriority. It is the arena where the “internal outside” of the law appears, the
exteriority of its exteriority, the practice of its concepts. The law—a legacy of the Greek
philosophy of nomos—is that which law’s practice—a legacy of the Roman practice of
ius, continuously deranges by demonstrating the impossibility of the former’s claims,
whatever they may be.22 In Coldness and Cruelty, this opposition was clear: the “images
of the law,” having been conceived throughout the history of philosophy (Plato or
Kant), were always in symmetric opposition to the critiques of these same images.23
But these critiques were themselves only the first moment of a much more radical
derangement within the system of the law: a purely negative moment followed by a
positive moment. The negative moment was that of the philosophical critique—the
positive, that of the legal clinic.
21.

Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Mille Plateaux (Minuit 1980).

22.

On the reconstruction of this thesis, see de Sutter, supra note 12, at 104–05.

23.

Cf. Deleuze, supra note 9, at 71.
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XIII. PHILOSOPHY’S SELF-DESTRUCTION

Such, perhaps, was the source of Deleuze’s uneasiness: philosophy, because it
continued to dismiss the possibility of an outside of concept (an outside of the cerebral),
remained grafted to a juridical thought. Girls who derange—through the fantasies
that they arouse—the cerebral order of desire had to be rejected by juridical thought
in the same way that the practice of law had to be presented as antagonistic to
philosophy. But, since Deleuze’s philosophical endeavor aimed precisely to reintroduce
into the order of philosophy this outside that had previously been excluded, he needed
girls just as he needed legal practice. He needed them for structural reasons—to
establish the possibility of an outside of philosophy—as much as for personal reasons—
to restore the presence of his fantasy (that which was unmentionable). That he never
wished to justify these reasons and that he prohibited any future publication of the
text that would allow one to uncover these reasons are two of the most awkward
theoretical moves of the past half-century. To give girls and the practice of law a
philosophical dignity, as antagonists of philosophy, could only have been a foreseeable
possibility had Deleuze accepted the reality of fantasies and the necessity of the
spectator. However, since he had decided, due to historical context, to follow the
contemporary critical movement of the imaginary and of the subject, he foreclosed the
possibility. Retrospectively, the true radicalism of his thought resided not in this
satisfecit given to the requirements of his time, but in the proclamation of philosophy’s
self-destruction. Self-destruction was placed at the heart of his thinking, like a
landmine waiting to be detonated—waiting because Deleuze, after having placed it,
had preferred to pull out of the danger zone. Or, at least, he pretended to try—an
attempt that could very well have been just another one of his tricks.
XIV. PORNOLOGY = GIRLS + IMAGES + THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Despite his rejection of “mindless eroticism,” there is one of Deleuze’s words that
must be remembered: we need, he explained in Coldness and Cruelty, a new
“pornology.”24 This word, which occurs only once (in Coldness and Cruelty), is not the
object of a specific development, and, if nothing else, is used in order to point to the
application of a pornographic logic to philosophy. Like the concept of “simulacra” in
The Logic of Sense or in Difference and Repetition, 25 this was also a kind of theoretical
hapax that was abandoned the moment it appeared, before any decisive installation
could be made. Again, perhaps one must see in this almost immediate denial the
trace of a temptation that was existentially irresistible, but one that philosophy’s
exigencies are inclined to reject. However, as with girls and the practice of law
(simulacra or, shall we say, images), this temptation seems to involve more than a
simple intuition; it lays out a veritable system. For Alain Badiou, all of Deleuze’s
philosophy needed to be considered a system, in the same way one considers Classical
French Philosophy, namely that of Descartes or Malebranche, to be a system of its
24.

Id. at 18.

25.

Gilles Deleuze, Différence et Répétition (1968).

94

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 57 | 2012/13

own.26 If this is true, then one must not forget to add that Deleuze’s philosophical
system is coupled with a drop shadow: a counter-system continuously coming to
parasitize the perfection of the first system. Girls, the practice of law, and images
form the main parts of this counter-system—a counter-system whose name it would
not be far-fetched to suppose is, precisely, “pornology.” Pornology is the antiphilosophic
move by which philosophy gives itself its own outside, while at the same time doing
all in its power to ensure that this outside will be declared impossible. Thus, the
following equation—pornology = girls + images + practice of law—is an
antiphilosophic and explosive equation with which, though Deleuze refused to
explicitly use it, he went about undermining his texts. Deleuze two-timed himself.
XV. THE THREE THEOREMS OF LEGAL PORNOLOGY

It would require numerous efforts to fully reconstruct Deleuze’s antiphilosophic
system—and to do it the justice that Deleuze denied it. In guise of introduction,
perhaps, one could remember only the most important of the enounced while waiting
for a more rigorous coherence, somewhere, someday. The enounced are numbered at
three and form three theorems capable of both demonstration and illustration: the
theorem of girl, the theorem of image, and the theorem of the practice of law. The
theorem of girls would be: all order gives rise to its own disorder in the attempt to foreclose
its possibility—the foreclosure of the possibility of disorder creates disorder. Then,
the theorem of image: all reality gives rise to its own limitlessness in the attempt to exclude
its opposite—it is the refusal of fantasies that makes them a reality. Finally, the
theorem of the practice of law: law—as a system of rules—gives rise to its own annulment
in the attempt to control practice—it is the avowal of the supremacy of the law that
annuls all possibility of the law. If it is difficult to articulate these three theorems in
a manner other than their equivalence—where girls, the practice of law, and images
would be one and the same—one may always try. Thus, let us propose this: the girl,
being that which arouses in the law fantasies (images) that perturb the cerebral
regularity of its desire, is the conceptual persona of which law is the practice. As an
aphorism: the practice of law is the cosmetics of disorder, and thus the vibration of
life introduced into the interior of the abstract order of the law. Undoubtedly, this
lesson will be found to be deceiving. Undoubtedly, to transform the practice of law
into the incarnation of life will be considered a very narrow (because it is libidinal)
understanding of the latter. It is possible, however, given that a broad understanding
of life has consistently contributed to juridical thought, it is only this narrow type of
understanding that, from now on, will be able to turn us on.

26. Cf. Badiou, supra note 20, at 29.
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